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Remote attestation (RA) is a means of malware detection, typically realized as an interaction between a trusted verifier and a potentially compromised remote device (prover). RA is especially relevant for low-end embedded devices that are incapable of protecting themselves against malware infection. Most current RA techniques require on-demand and uninterruptible (atomic) operation. The former fails to detect transient malware that enters and leaves between successive RA instances; the latter involves performing potentially time-consuming computation over prover's memory and/or storage, which can be harmful to the device's safety-critical functionality and general availability. However, relaxing either on-demand or atomic RA operation is tricky and prone to vulnerabilities. This paper identifies some issues that arise in reconciling requirements of safety-critical operation with those of secure remote attestation, including detection of transient and self-relocating malware. It also investigates mitigation techniques, including periodic self-measurements as well as interruptible attestation modality that involves shuffled memory traversals and various memory locking mechanisms. 

The Internet-of-Things (IoT) is a large and complex domain. These systems are often constructed using a very diverse set of hardware, software and protocols. This, combined with the ever increasing number of IoT solutions/services that are rushed to market means that most such systems are rife with security holes. Recent incidents (e.g., the Mirai botnet) further highlight such security issues. With emerging technologies such as blockchain and software-defined networks (SDNs), new security solutions are possible in the IoT domain. In this paper we will explore future trends in IoT security: (a) the use of blockchains in IoT security, (b) data provenance for sensor information, (c) reliable and secure transport mechanisms using SDNs (d) scalable authentication and remote attestation mechanisms for IoT devices and (e) threat modeling and risk/maturity assessment frameworks for the domain.